President's Corner

War Outcome Will Shape Future Investments

by Lt. Gen. Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret)

May 2003 — As we watch events unfold in Iraq, it would be fair to predict that the outcome and lessons of this conflict will influence the Defense Department’s investments for at least the next 15 years.

The post-war hot-wash will not only affect acquisition spending decisions but also tactics, training, and doctrine—not to mention the overall thinking of military planners and policy makers about how the lessons from this conflict can help us do better next time. Operation Iraqi Freedom, as Gen. Tommy Franks said, is unlike any other campaign the United States has ever fought. But this war, like every other war, reaffirms some basic principles. The battles our troops have been engaged in have proved once again that training pays off in big ways and that there is no substitute for well-executed combined-arms coordination. It is no secret that wars are won by those who can maintain the element of surprise and can bring their firepower to bear most effectively. In other words, success in war requires a balanced mix of firepower, information, and mobility.

What does this mean in terms of future investment decisions for national defense?

The developments seen so far in this war reaffirm one of the key tenets of the military “transformation” effort that has been underway for several years. The integration of firepower (through combined arms), maneuver, and information (also known as network-centric warfare) is critical to the success of “effect-based operations,” where the intent is to minimize civilian casualties. All the services are moving toward network-centric warfare. Their long-term investment plans reflect that. The Army, for instance, is heading in that direction with its Future Combat System, which places the soldier at the center of networked fires and information.

Some critics have charged that our ground forces in Iraq were not heavy or large enough. That criticism appeared to overlook the effectiveness of our combined arms formations. The more important questions are: how capable is the whole combined arms team, how effectively are the fires coordinated, and how fast can the information be passed around. One of the success stories of this campaign is the rapid movement of the 3rd Infantry Division to positions south of Baghdad, effectively fixing Iraqi ground formations. From that point on, joint fires (artillery, fighters, bombers, and attack helicopters) weakened those “fixed forces” before they were ultimately destroyed. The success of this combined arms effort was enabled by superior intelligence, superior mobility and fires, and superior integration—all tied together by a robust command and control network.
This notion of “linking the battlefield” will continue to underpin future investments in defense research, development, and acquisition. In the Iraq conflict, which presented a complex battle-space, effective network-centricity was achieved, with mobile command-and-control centers and sensors that gave commanders access to real-time data from unmanned aerial vehicles, from the Joint STARS and the AWACS radar aircraft, from strategic overhead assets and from ground intelligence. Notably, leadership targets were struck in real time. In one instance, time from “go” to bombs-on-target was four hours. In another instance, it was less than 15 minutes.

As good as overall performance has been, additional capabilities are needed for battlefield situational awareness and tracking smaller units at the tactical level. The ability to track individual Marine rifle companies, for example, could help improve our force-protection capabilities. Having tactical sensors that can see inside buildings and behind walls would provide a significant edge in urban combat, preventing unpleasant surprises such as those experienced by U.S. Marines and soldiers in the battles for the Iraqi cities of Nasiriyah and Karbala.
These preliminary observations tell us that our capabilities can still be improved in a number of areas. These are just a few that come to mind.

Technologies to prevent friendly fire. Fratricide happens in every war, to be sure. It’s noteworthy to recall that Confederate Gen. Stonewall Jackson was killed by his own troops. But friendly fire should not be accepted as inevitable. Technologies that “de-conflict” the battlefield certainly can be improved so we can positively identify friend and foe.
Cruise-missile defense. A Chinese cruise missile that Iraq launched into Kuwait last month was missed by the U.S. Patriot air-defense radar. Those low-flying missiles pose a significant threat. They are available in the open market and quickly are proliferating. The Missile Defense Agency and the Army Space and Missile Defense Command have been working on technologies to defeat cruise missiles. We have not yet solved this problem.
Mine Countermeasures. After two U.S. ships were severely damaged by sea mines in Operation Desert Storm 12 years ago, the Navy said it would focus on the problem and develop technologies to better detect and neutralize these silent killers. Investments in mine warfare have been up and down in recent years, and we still have deficiencies. In the current conflict, ships that were bringing humanitarian relief supplies to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr were held up for several days, for fear that the Iraqis had spread mines in the surrounding waters. In this case, a relatively unsophisticated opponent was able to delay operations.
Reducing the Logistics Footprint. More than two-thirds of the tonnage we bring to combat is fuel and water. When our forces were marching toward Baghdad, it was clear that getting enough trucks and securing those supply lines would be a challenge. The best way to solve this problem would be to reduce the battlefield demand for fuel and water. Technology can help do that. The Army has been funding development of hybrid vehicles and fuel cells that could drastically cut the fuel consumption of tanks and trucks. There is also research work underway to create technologies that can convert fuel exhaust into fresh water. It’s a legitimate technology effort that could pay off in the future.
Improving Net-Centricity. The services are working hard on this and will place renewed emphasis on existing programs. The Air Force is seeking to place weapons in the network by equipping bombs and missiles with data links, so they can “plug and play.” The Army will continue to refine the direction of its Future Combat System. The Navy also will fine-tune efforts to add precision and responsiveness to its weapons. The Marines will move along with their programs to enhance precision, mobility, and firepower, as it integrates its forces into all aspects of the joint combined arms team.

Discussions about what we will learn from this conflict are not likely to end any time soon. It is important for us in the defense community to engage in this debate and focus our thinking so that we can benefit those soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen who will be fighting the next war.

Please e-mail your comments to lfarrell@ndia.org.

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President's Corner

War Outcome Will Shape Future Investments

by Lt. Gen. Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF (Ret)

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